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Although this is a working papers, all of the papers in this volume underwent anonymous peer review, being read by both faculty and graduate students at the University of Oklahoma. All authors made revisions in response to reviewer comments. We thank all of the authors for their valuable contributions to the second volume of this journal.

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This article presents an original story in Chickasaw, narrated, translated and transcribed by the author. First the author provides some autobiographical information and a discussion about naming practices in Chickasaw. Then the story about Lokosh and Possum is presented, first in Chickasaw and then the English translation.

Keywords: Chickasaw, naming, personal narrative, storytelling

1. Katahaat Lokosh? ‘Who is Lokosh?’

While I’d like to claim that Lokosh is a great cultural hero among the Chickasaw, this is not the case. I would even settle for the status of a revered trickster like Chokfi’ for the southeastern Indians, or Saynday for the Kiowa, but sadly this is also false. Lokosh, the subject of this story, is in fact, me. I was born in Memphis, Tennessee in the fall of 1978. My grandmother Faye Elizabeth Cox Nichols and my mother Charla Nichols Hinson are citizens of the Chickasaw Nation, Kowishto’ Iksa’ (Panther Clan), Imatapo Inchokka’ (Their Tent People House). They are also of Choctaw, English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh descent. My father Waymon Ray Hinson is a lineal descendant of Hoboi-Hili-Miko (Good Child King) Alexander McGillivray, Wind Clan, of Hickory Ground and Joe Vann, Cherokee. He is also of PeeDee, Waccamaw, Edisto, English, and French descent.

I was born into what I consider a very typical mixed blood Indian family. We lived outside the Chickasaw service area in Oklahoma. Our cultural identity was really that of proud descendants, who while knowledgeable of our family history and the prominent role that our ancestors played in Chickasaw survivance from the 1730s to present, had little to no interaction, political, social, or otherwise, with our tribal people in Oklahoma. Of course we had a great many relatives in the Chickasaw Nation, many of whom were intimately involved in the daily activities of the Chickasaw Nation. Living in west Texas, we simply had little to no access to our people, beyond our immediate cousins, aunts, and uncles.

My Chickasaw connection was really through my great grandmother, Charlie Perkins Cox, who was an original Chickasaw enrollee. The stories of her life, and the stories of her ancestors, retold by her daughter - my grandmother - had a significant bearing, for me, on what it meant to be Chickasaw. Still, my great grandmother was a product of the all-too-efficient boarding school system, and she had very little cultural knowledge. To this day I am unsure if she could speak or understand any Chickasaw at all. I know my grandmother never learned to speak it.

I began to really engage with my Chickasaw ancestry, and explore what it meant to be Chickasaw, when my first son was born. Levi arrived in the spring of 2000. I called him Chokfi’ (Rabbit) because it seemed like a good name for him. I wanted for him something more than I had – a real sense, from birth, of his place in the world as a Chickasaw person. I wanted to give him access to his language, history, and culture to a degree that I was not afforded.
So with that I began in earnest to learn to speak my language. Through self-study, trial and error, spending summers in the Chickasaw Nation, particularly hanging out with native speakers and trying to talk, I developed a certain proficiency by the time my second son arrived. Noah, who is called Labaachi’ (Talks All the Time), was born at Carl Albert Indian Health Facility in the late winter of 2005. I greeted him with Choctaw hymns after he was clean and swaddled. Some of the first words he heard were in his language.

Since that time I have continued to strive to grow my cultural understanding, and particularly my language skills. I also engaged with tribal artists, learning to make ballsticks, rattles, horn spoons, and other art forms. My artistic production on paper and canvas shifted completely to tribal themes using the visual language of our Mississippian ancestors. When my two adopted children, Ruslan, called Minko’ (Leader) and Andrey, called Chakwihili’ (Possum) arrived in 2011, I had a secure, confident and solidly-formed identity as a Chickasaw person. I know who I am, where I come from, and what my ancestors suffered through to ensure that I can stand up today. I serve my people as the director of the department of Chickasaw Language, Chickasaw Language Revitalization Program.

I am a blessed man.

2. Nanna Hochifo Ishtanompoli: About Naming

In general, we as Chickasaw people gave up traditional naming a long time ago. While some speakers still have Chickasaw nicknames, as did many others of their generation, it is rare to find a Chickasaw person with a proper Chickasaw name. Even my own children have Christian names, with Chickasaw names bestowed on them by me. This would have been the way it was done in the old days, the father choosing names from his mother’s line. According to Speck’s consultant Shabichichi, Chickasaw fathers would name their child three days following their birth. They did this in consultation with their relatives, who would suggest a name taken from clan ancestors. The father would report this name to his wife, who would dress the child’s neck with a handkerchief, ribbon, or beads (Speck 1950). Male children were called Kabi’ and female children were called Ki’o until their naming took place. For male children, these personal or family names were supplanted by war names following adulthood (Swanton, 1928). War names were emblematic of war deeds, and an individual could receive many of them over their lifetime, and in the cases of grave mistakes in battle, a warrior could be reduced to his child name. Reducing a man from Pa’atabi (He Whooped and Killed) to Chola (Fox) would surely be a mighty blow to his esteem.

In my case, I received my Christian names at birth, and was given a Chickasaw name only as an adult, perhaps appropriately at a time when I embraced my identity as a mixed-blood Chickasaw person, rather than a white person with Chickasaw ancestry. For me, these are quite different things. I felt comfortable as a Chickasaw descendent, but not confident enough in my appearance, my raising, nor my cultural knowledge to claim to be a ‘real’ Chickasaw.

I am glad that I changed my thinking on this.

A speaker named JoAnn Ellis, who, out of all the living speakers, I have learned from the longest, decided that she was going to name me Gourd. We were sitting in my office, talking about nothing really, when she made a comment about my apparent affinity for gourds (given that I had a great many in my office at the time). She was most taken with an incredibly large
dipper gourd that I keep on top of a bookcase. JoAnn looked at me and said simply, "That’s a good name for you - Lokosh, that’s your name now.” Beyond the obvious, there may have been some other motivation for my naming. There was a Chickasaw man in the community who was called Lokosh. He died many years ago, but it could be that I recalled him to her mind. I also have a decidedly round, gourd-like torso, which could also account for my naming. At any rate, I was from that point known simply as Lokosh.

It is a good name I think.

3. Nannanoli’ Ishtanompoli: About Stories

As I have written elsewhere (Haag, ed. 2016, manuscript in preparation) humor or joke stories are a vital sub-genre of traditional storytelling. These humor stories are based on fact, embellishments of true stories that are retold again and again because they are often truly, exceptionally humorous, particularly if the audience knows the storyteller or the story subject well. Still others are mythical, fantastical stories with scant truth, and still others are told solely to induce laughter, which Indian people like to do.

This is my attempt at telling a real nannangli’. This event really happened – right in the middle of Ada, Oklahoma. We were living on 16th Street at the time, in an original Ada township home, right across from the First Baptist Church. We had had an ongoing problem with curious possums (surely they felt comfortable scavenging from our trash and rooting under our home, knowing that we were a good Indian family that would not kill them). One evening an unlucky possum wandered into our yard and the following is what ensued.

I think it is a pretty good story altogether.

4. Lokoshat Chakwihili’ Afama

1. Oklhili chaffakā Lokosh imihoo táwwa'at nosikat káyya'hattoo aachi.
2. Nosit káyya'hattoo kochcha' nannahmat ittibakaká'chittook aachi.

4. Káyya'hakat já'makat haklottook.
5. Anqwa' ittibâkkaklî'chihmâ Lokoshat imaachihmâ, “Pistayalimak illa, hattak honkop'a at abooha chokkowa mihaha'ni,” aa'shna imihooat, “Yahmishanha'shki!” imaachittook.

6. Haatokoot Lokoshaashshoot hi'kacha aahashtahlî'mâ onahmat kochcha' pitpisahmâ chakwihili'oot wáyya'ana pisatttook.
7. Chakwihili'mat wáyya'at okkis-oshi'a ibichchala' akallochittook.
8. Naahollaat okkis-oshi'mâ 'crawl space grate’ hochifo.
9. Lokoshat kochchamhâ chakwihili'at ibichchala' akallochitkoot achôshsho'wakat já'mattook.
10. Chakwihili'mat ibichchala' ishkochcha mihahookya ishkochcha kî'yokittook.
11. Kanjhka wahhaalattook.

13. Chakwihili'at anompįfalammichikat “HISSSSSSSSSS!” imaachittook.
15. Chakwihili'at hashaat ta'hacha ántat wahhaalattook.
16. Lokoshat pįsattooook chakwihili'at ibichchala' akallochikat hashaaka.
17. Kanjįkà wahhaalattook.
18. Ibichchala' ishkochcha ki'yokittook.

19. Lokoshat chakwihili' apila bannahooookya apilakma chakwihili'at kisila'ni imahoobattook.
20. Kisila'ni ikbannohootokoot abooha anonka' falamat o'nacha naafkishto' fokhacha ilbak fokhi' ooti'shcha fokhakmat kochcha' onahookya chakwihili'mat talhofficha kaniyattook.
22. Chakwihili'at talhofficha haksi chihmit ġattook.
23. Chokfóll'o'ha chihmit ġattook.
25. Yammak illa.

4.1 Gourd Encounters a Possum
1. Some time ago Gourd and his wife were laying together asleep [they say].
2. They lay there asleep and outside the house something was making a knocking sound [they say].
3. When Gourd heard it he asked his wife “Are you hearing that? Something might be out there, making a knocking sound,” and she answered “Yes, I hear it,” he said [they say].

4. They remained laying there, listening together.
5. When the knocking sound came again, knocking and knocking, Gourd said to her “I have to go see it, a criminal might be trying to break into the house.” and she said “Be careful.”

6. So Gourd got up, and getting to the window he was looking outside and saw a possum there.
7. Standing there the possum had his nose stuck tightly in a little door.
8. White folks call this little door a crawl space grate.
9. Gourd went outside and the possum’s nose was truly stuck tightly in the little door.
10. The possum was trying to get his nose out – really trying to get it out, but his nose would not come out [they say].
11. He was really struggling there, [they say].

12. So Gourd asked the possum “Why are you here? Are you trying to get in under my house? Do you want me to help you?”.
13. The possum answered “HISSSSSSSSSS!”.
14. When possums are scared or angry they really hiss at you.
15. The possum was completely angry, struggling there.
16. Gourd was looking at him and his nose was stuck tightly in the little door, so he was very angry.
17. He really struggled there.
18. He was unable to get free, [they say].

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19. Gourd wanted to help the possum but if he helped him and the possum got free, the possum might bite him.
20. He didn’t want to get bitten so he went back inside the house and getting his coat and gloves, put them on and went back outside – but the possum was free, and going away.

21. How the possum got free, Gourd didn’t know but possum was free, his nose no longer stuck tightly in the little door.
22. The possum was free and going along like he was drunk.
23. He was like a drunk person. He was going along as if he was half-drunk, [they say].

24. Gourd said “That possum must’ve been a Seminole possum. If that possum had been a Chickasaw possum, he would’ve answered me back in Chickasaw,” he said.

25. That’s it.
Appendix: A Note on Chickasaw Writing and Sounds

Chickasaw has two primary orthographies that are used in the community and in the literature. One orthography, often referred to as the analytical orthography, was created by Dr. Pam Munro with Chickasaw speaker Catherine Willmond (1994). This is the orthography used in this paper. The analytical orthography includes the following characters: ', a, aa, a, b, ch, d, e, f, h, i, ii, i, k, l, lh, m, n, ng, o, oo, q, p, r, s, sh, t, u, v, w, y, z. Borrow words can contain other characters, such as: d, e, g, r, u, v, z. Twenty-one of the characters represent consonants and approximants, which are summarized in Figure 1, with examples given in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plosive</th>
<th>Bilabial</th>
<th>Labiodental</th>
<th>Alveolar</th>
<th>Post-Alveolar</th>
<th>Palatal</th>
<th>Velar</th>
<th>Glottal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p, b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>k</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nasal</td>
<td>m</td>
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<td>Affricate</td>
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<td>Fricative</td>
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<td>j</td>
<td></td>
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<td>h</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lateral Fricative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approximant</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>j</td>
<td>w</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lateral Approximant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>l</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1.** Chickasaw consonant phonemes (from Gordon, Munro and Ladefoged 2001)

| p  | /paska/ | paska | ‘bread’ |
| b  | /balaʔ/ | bala' | ‘bean’ |
| t  | /topa/  | topa  | ‘bed’  |
| k  | /konʔ/  | koni  | ‘skunk’|
|ʔ f | /ofiʔ/  | ofi'  | ‘dog’  |
|tf | /tʃa:ha/ | chaaha | ‘she is tall’ |
|f  | /fala/  | fala  | ‘crow’ |
|s  | /sintiʔ/ | sinti' | ‘snake’ |
|l  | /lipa/  | lhipa | ‘it is dry’ |
|ʃ  | /ʃantiʔ/ | shanti' | ‘rat’ |
|h  | /hika/  | hika  | ‘she stands up’ |
|m  | /mahli/ | mahli | ‘wind’ |
|n  | /nitaʔ/ | nita' | ‘bear’ |
|l  | /lapiʔ/ | lapish | ‘horn’ |
|ʃ  | /ʃaʔaʔ/ | yala  | ‘locust larva’ |
|w  | /wa:kaʔ/ | waaka' | ‘cow’ |

**Figure 2.** Examples of the modern orthography (from Gordon, Munro and Ladefoged 2001)
Chickasaw has three phonemic short vowels /i/, /o/, and /a/, three phonemic long vowels /iː/, /oː/, and /aː/, and three phonemic nasal vowels /ĩ/, /õ/, /ã/. The vowels are summarized in Figure 3, with examples given in Figure 4.

![Figure 3. Chickasaw vowel phonemes (from Gordon, Munro and Ladefoged 2001)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vowel</th>
<th>Phoneme</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>/pisa/</td>
<td>pisa</td>
<td>‘she looks at him’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iː</td>
<td>/piːniʔ/</td>
<td>piini'</td>
<td>‘boat’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iː</td>
<td>/iːsintiʔ/</td>
<td>ǐsinti'</td>
<td>‘his snake’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>/paska/</td>
<td>paska</td>
<td>‘bread’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aː</td>
<td>/sahaˑʃaː/</td>
<td>sahashaa</td>
<td>‘I’m angry’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aː</td>
<td>/ipãːʃiʔ/</td>
<td>ipãši'</td>
<td>‘hair’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o</td>
<td>/ofiʔ/</td>
<td>ofi'</td>
<td>‘dog’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oː</td>
<td>/ihoː/</td>
<td>ihoo</td>
<td>‘woman’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ōː</td>
<td>/isōːlaʃ/</td>
<td>isãlash</td>
<td>‘tongue’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.** Chickasaw vowel phonemes (from Gordon, Munro and Ladefoged 2001)

**Figure 4.** Examples of the modern orthography (from Gordon, Munro and Ladefoged 2001)
References


A Responsibility to Understand: 
Language, Art, and Patterns of Interpretation and Representation in Colonial Contexts

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This paper examines linguistic and artistic intercultural communication between Indigenous and colonial communities, individuals, and institutions. It will focus on the interpretive difficulties colonial audiences encountered in certain key events: an Aboriginal Title trial in Canada, two curated displays of Indigenous art works and artefacts in the United States, and the work of Haida artist and activist Bill Reid. In each of these cases, Indigenous communicators saw their messages severely decontextualized and reinterpreted using a colonial framework. Additionally, the pressure to be ‘authentically’ Indigenous while in a ‘modern’ setting caught many interlocutors in a double bind. Colonial audience members either interpreted communications on their own terms or framed them as belonging to a static, past tense, premodern society. I will argue that in an intercultural setting, an Indigenous communicator may find it difficult to position themself as part of a living and dynamic Indigeneity without facing charges of inauthenticity. Settler colonial interlocutors may need to interrogate both assumptions and institutions to engage in dialogue responsibly. This has important ramifications for Indigenous sovereignty claims and the role of colonial interpreters in them.

Keywords: modernity, oral tradition, indigenous, art, law, sovereignty

1. Introduction

In any community, the meanings assigned to geographical features and acts of speech will be influenced by the subjective determinations of the people who assign them, and these determinations, needless to say, will exhibit variation. But the character of the meanings – their steadier themes, their recurrent tonalities, and, above all, their conventionalized modes of expression – will bear the stamp of a common cast of mind. Constructions of reality that reflect conceptions of reality itself, the meanings of landscapes and acts of speech are personalized manifestations of a shared perspective on the human condition. (Basso 1988: 100)

Intercultural communication is famously difficult; underneath the problem of a language barrier are numerous other pitfalls. Cultural content and inaccessible references are hurdles made far taller by, as Keith Basso says above so well, ‘their conventionalized modes of expression,’ or the unique ways in which they are encoded. While content and code incongruitities may provoke communicative problems in any context, there is a unique form that the intercultural disconnect takes in certain colonial settings. With a focus on artistic and lingustic intercultural communication between Indigenous and colonial communities, individuals, and institutions, this paper will explore the challenges that Indigenous interlocutors and their messages may face. It
will draw themes from cases of Indigenous land claims and art works, focusing on comparative examples from North America and Australia. Across all instances, the central interpretive conflict involves a colonial audiences’ inability to reconcile Indigeneity with so-called “modern” settings.

The discursive patterns of concern in this paper are identified by other authors but made especially salient by repetition across radically different contexts (Battiste 2000; Briggs 1996; King 2011; Myers 1991; Remillard 2011). In the first sections of this paper, I will discuss shared patterns of interaction wherein an Indigenous communicator sees their message stripped of its context, code, and connotations and then decoded using a colonial framework. This is particularly likely when the colonial audience sees the method of communication as a universal category. An Indigenous communicator is also faced with the challenge of proving that they are ‘authentic,’ despite (or because of) their presence in a ‘modern’ setting. In both challenges, interpretation and authenticity, is the implication that colonial audiences are only open to Indigenous communication if they can approach it on their own territory. In other words, audiences either approach the communication on their own terms, or they contextualize it as belonging to a dead or dying, static, past tense society. There is little room left for lived, postcolonial Indigenous culture. This paper will conclude with an exploration of ways in which we might pay more attention to colonial discourses and de-code intercultural communication more accurately and responsibly.

1.1 Context and Terminology

The notion of “modernity” is a copiously defined term, referring variously to a historical era, a scientific paradigm, a tool for colonization, an epistemology, and a myth (Bhaba 1999; Foucault 1994; Latour 1993; McLean 2013; Youngblood Henderson in Battiste 2000). In this paper the meaning of “modernity” or “modern” borrows from many of these definitions and refers not to an era, but to an ideology based in the notion that ‘civilized’ humanity is fundamentally separate from nature. In practice, this ideology has historically lined up with industrial development, colonialism, and cultural evolutionism to pigeonhole Indigenous peoples as belonging to a primitive ‘state of nature’ that creates a moral imperative for colonial expansion: the infamous white man’s burden (Youngblood Henderson in Battiste 2000). In now-colonized regions such as North America and Australia, the ideology of modernity persists and continues to raise barriers for Indigenous agents. Numerous critiques of modernity have populated 20th century scholarship (Foucault 1994; Latour 1993). Currently, many scholars are now pursuing the idea of multiple modernities and re-evaluating the power of this fundamentally Eurocentric term (Bhaba 1999; McLean 2013; Russo 2013). While this discussion will not be addressed directly in this paper, diversifying the histories we use to evaluate the present is an important step towards decolonization and may be a natural consequence of interrogating the epistemology outlined above. In this paper, ‘modern’ may also be used to refer to modern art, but the distinction will be made clear.

Ethnographic scholarship and anthropology have numerous links, historical and contemporary, with modernity and colonization. Therefore, an important note has to do with the role of the anthropologist as author and interpreter. One of the main interests I have in this paper (as an anthropologist of settler-colonial background) is to try to identify places where pitfalls exist, examine them, and pursue ongoing personal decolonization. I do not intend this paper to be taken as either determinism or prescriptivism, simply to contend that the discourses identified create real barriers and that an understanding of them is important for mindful intercultural
communication in nations like Canada, which are still living with structures built by past and present colonial practices. Most importantly, this paper is focused on a critique of “modernity” in action and is not intended to speak for Indigenous agents.

Correspondingly, recent scholarship coming from Native Studies in Canada emphasizes the problematic ways in which Indigeneity has been defined: strictly as ‘the colonized,’ for instance, which sets up a false binary and erases all parts of identity not connected with subjugation (Battiste 2000). Attempts to define ‘what it means to be Indigenous’ are exactly what cause the problems this paper discusses, and have been satirized aptly by many, including author Thomas King in the appropriately titled lecture “You’re Not the Indian I Had in Mind” (2011). King explores the challenges inherent in trying to be an ‘authentic Indian’ without dressing up to perform an imaginary, unifying race (2011: 42).

In this paper, the reader should be aware of the complexity inherent in using the word Indigenous in opposition to colonial (or ‘modern’ or ‘Western’) as a kind of catch-all for everyone who is left over, especially since some individuals self-identify as neither or both or change throughout their lifetimes, including one of the artists that will be discussed in this paper. The use of these terms is not intended to set up an absolute binary, more to signal a power imbalance that is both historical and intergenerational. ‘Modern,’ ‘colonial,’ ‘Western:’ all of these are meant to ask for self-awareness, not to be accusatory. Indeed, just as modernity does not refer to a definable era but to an epistemology that refers to it, ‘Indigenous’ and ‘colonial’ are tools to think with that can only be reified in far more complex ways than such a simple binary suggests.

2. Sovereignty and Interpretation

In courts of law, art galleries, museums, newspapers, and elsewhere, Indigenous sovereignty is examined and interpreted by a colonial audience, often one which has some degree of power or jurisdiction over the success of sovereignty projects. Sovereignty implies a greater or lesser degree of self-determination and connection to land: while it may be used as a legal category by nation-states, it may also be used to imply a different and more fundamental autonomy that precedes contemporary political boundaries. To begin drawing out the discursive themes in colonial interpretive efforts, I will use two different instances of Indigenous land claims, both of which employ codes that are unfamiliar to their audiences. ‘Audience’ should not imply passivity: in both examples to follow, audience members (judges and art critics) not only view and attempt to interpret Indigenous land claims, but their interpretations also have power in the courtroom, the art world, and the public eye. Art and language, in these cases, may prove enigmatic in part because they are frequently assumed to have universal definitions (to mean the same thing, or to be used in approximately the same way across cultural boundaries). Language and art are often considered to be fundamental characteristic of humanity, obscuring the places where mutual intelligibility unexpectedly dissolve (Hymes 1996: 26; Gell 1992: 41); however, a single language such as English can contain innumerable speech communities, and can often adopt semantic, phonological, and syntactic patterns distinctive to a speaker’s region and culture (Hymes 1996: 66). The assumption of universality in the following examples allows audience members to misunderstand the meaning of each communicator’s claim, either by first decontextualizing it and then approaching it on colonial terms, or by mischaracterizing its context as Indigenous, but an immortalized version of ‘Indigenous’ that fits the modern imagination.
Our first example is Canadian. In the 1997 Aboriginal Title trial Delgamuukw v. B.C., Indigenous Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en claimants used oral histories and traditions to lay claim to land, including the use of chiefly names to assert property rights (Palmer 2000: 1042). The importance of naming, kinship, and property was implicit in the code (language norms) used by Indigenous speakers, but was misinterpreted by the arbitrating judge. Our second example is from Australia, where Indigenous actors similarly draw on kinship and associated rights to assert a land claim. Pintupi Aboriginal artists, coming from traditional territories in Australia brought an exhibition of acrylics to New York City in 1988 and explained to their audience that it was each artist’s intergenerational property rights that allowed them to access and portray the images on each canvas (Myers 1991: 497). The land, and the events from the Dreaming that happened there, could only be shown by “the owners of the place, especially those whose own “spirits” come from that Dreaming” (Myers 1991: 497). Just as the use of a Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en chiefly name implies land ownership (a practice common on the Northwest Coast), so too does the use of an image from the Dreaming (Myers 1991: 497; Palmer 2000: 1042).

Without appropriate attention to context, claims to territory may then appear as nothing more than an aesthetically intriguing acrylic or a denotative proper noun. In Canada, while the court case did result in instructions that oral history could be admitted as testimony in a land claims case, it became evident that the skills needed to interpret oral history and give it the same weight as written historical evidence were not yet in place (Palmer 2000: 1041). By continually failing to fully comprehend the implications of oral history turned testimony for Indigenous populations, the courts have undervalued oral history with their preference for written or archeological evidence (Palmer 2000: 1046). Speech and written evidence are far from isomorphic, and the legal analysis that approaches oral history as a text simply read aloud will fail to appreciate the important differences in communicative styles (Hymes 1996: 38). Delgamuukw v. B.C features the process of erasing linguistic complexity; the centripetal force of linguistic uniformity in colonial contexts is one layer of this (Gal & Irvine 1995, Bakhtin 1981: 271, Hymes 1996: 84). The assumption of linguistic universality is not a feature that is limited to language, however, and reoccurs in the comparative example of Pintupi acrylics. In both cases, land claims were erased by the insistence of audience members to hear or see the message using their own discursive norms.

Following the 1988 Pintupi acrylics exhibition, Fred Myers demonstrates that most of the critical representations of Aboriginal art construct the Pintupi acrylics as part of the Western art world, either by making a contribution to modern art or by demonstrating a ‘common humanity’ (1991: 498). And while it is reasonable to expect that parties will generally approach interactions using their own cultural discourses (Myers 1991: 499; Basso 1988: 101), it is also reasonable that the group who has placed themselves in an interpretive role (i.e. a court of law, an art critic) take responsibility for accurate interpretation. Again, in both of these cases the block for the interpreter appears to be less about the decontextualized content of Indigenous communications and more about the implications of the communicative code, something just as or more essential for communications analysis (Bateson 1972: 140; Mcluhan 1964; McLean 2013). In other words, while Delgamuukw is easily recognizable as a name and an acrylic painting might obviously contain an animal, if stripped of their context and connotations and coding most of all then that is all that they remain. The land claim disappears behind an aesthetically pleasing picture.

To quickly summarize where we have gone so far: one version of the colonial misinterpretation of these Indigenous sovereignty projects is the tendency to decontextualize, decode, and co-opt them without reaching a real understanding. Beyond just seeing the surface
meaning of these messages, audience members can create connotations for them using their own cultural backgrounds. This evaluates oral history by the same standards as legal testimony, and compares an Aboriginal acrylic to a piece of modern art. Incommensurable systems are used. There is another discursive pattern that emerges, however. Sometimes the audience does realize that it needs to contextualize these unfamilarly coded communications. Interestingly, and unfortunately, with contextualization appears to come the attempt to undermine or disenfranchise sovereignty claims, often using discourses of inauthenticity or impurity.

Authenticity is a debate frequently raised or dismantled in anthropological scholarship whenever it is claimed that a culture has ‘invented’ their traditions (Briggs 1996: 463; Bunten 2008; Sahlins 1993). Ironically, the presence of an Indigenous spokesperson in so ‘modern’ a context as a gallery or court of law can be used to disenfranchise them, if they are seen as too ‘contemporary’ to truly represent a traditional people. In linguistic terms, Gal and Irvine might refer to this kind of semiotic essentialism as ‘iconicity,’ wherein a cultural group that demonstrates too much heterogeneity in language practices is considered untrustworthy (1995). Signs of this tendency to look for purity and static traditions can be seen in both of our opening examples. In the land claim trial Delgamuukw v. B.C. (the title itself a misuse of a chiefly name), “it is the occupancy of the land (and its associated built structures), and not the perspectives of the people, that is most heavily weighted” (Palmer 2000: 1044). In attributing more value to the most immobile aspects of traditional material culture, the court inadvertently undermines the similar but spoken claims of Indigenous individuals. Likewise, while Pintupi work is being mischaracterized as modern art, primitive art, artifact, or tourist trap, painters “continually stress [that] their paintings are “stories” (turiku), representations of the events in the mythological past of the Dreaming…. that they are “true” (mularrpa), that they are not made up” (Myers 1991: 497). To appropriate, mischaracterize, or devalue the explanations of the Aboriginal painters “is to colonize doubly by denying them their own histories” (Myers 1991: 510). Despite this, Indigenous communicators may face criticisms of being inauthentic, reactionary, or sellouts, marketing their culture as kitsch for their own benefit. (Briggs 1996: 444; Bunten 2008).

In sovereignty cases, if an Indigenous mediator or claimant in a modern setting either faces criticism for being too integrated with the modern world, or finds their message being decontextualized and approached entirely on colonial terms, one interesting question to ask is what it takes for an Indigenous litigator, artist, spokesperson, businessperson, etc. to successfully navigate cross-cultural communication. Briggs uncovers the paradoxical demands implicit in such a role in his exploration of Indigenous dance troupes in Venezuela, arguing that for artists and choreographers to be deemed ‘authentic,’ they must refer to a distant and immortalized past (1996: 448). Simultaneously, selling themselves as the bearers of ahistorical traditions “problematises their extension into the future, for it envisions Warao culture as threatened with extinction due to its reliance on direct transmission by people who are motivated by an unconscious attachment to local forms that has purportedly been uprooted by modernity” (Briggs 1996: 448).

As such, Indigenous mediators on colonial stages must be prepared to “decontextualize… culture vis-à-vis its unmediated, local variants and to recontextualize it in discursive spaces that permit it be appreciated by the national society” (Briggs 1996: 454), while making themselves ready to face criticisms for being an improper cultural representative if they have attended an education institution, lived away from others of the population, or asked for money for their work. Just like the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en in Canada and the Pintupi artists in New York,
when an Indigenous communicator is contextualized, they may be undermined if their context does not meet standards of immortalized, ‘traditional’ Indigeneity. The next section will, among other things, examine what happens when an artist works willingly with the state and other commissioning bodies to represent traditional material culture as both authentic and dead, without the context of lived culture.

3. Power and Representation

Bill Reid (1920-1988) is a well-known Canadian artist of both Haida and Anglo-American descent. His works have appeared on Canadian currency, outside of the Canadian embassy in Washington DC, in the Vancouver airport, and in both galleries and museums in Canada and internationally. Throughout his career he has worked for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, but has also protested alongside the Haida and changed his position on the vitality of Indigenous art forms over the decades spanning his artistic life (Remillard 2011). He provides an interesting case study to add to this discussion of discursive themes because he has situated himself as both Indigenous and modern (both ideologically and artistically), and at times has aligned himself explicitly for or against colonial interests. As his friend Robert Bringhurst claimed in a memorial speech, “by his own account, Bill became a Haida artist long before he became a Haida” (2005: 187).

One of the themes thus far has been of decontextualization, and Bill Reid was initially a master of Haida form but attributed no cultural meanings to his work (a stance that changed later in his career) (Bringhurst 2005; Remillard 2011). As an artist, his early success could be attributed not only to considerable talent, but also to his willingness to promote his work as interpretable to a wider Canadian audience. One might say that his art was appealing to a preexisting aesthetic tradition just as we are to be happy to entertain land claims if we are convinced that we already own all the territory. I mean this both in the sense that we use familiar communicative codes, and in a very literal sense, wherein legal judgments “are made entirely within the context of an assumption that the Crown has the underlying title to all land, rather than in the context of an assumption of nation-to-nation relationship, where different systems of law (and different understandings of what constitutes a person or spirit) might be treated as commensurate” (Palmer 2000: 1049).

As such, one way for an artist with Indigenous subject matter to gain prominence is to keep their work subservient to the nation state and, thus, to be an interlocutor in a way that is acceptable to the resident dominant perception of what it means to be Indigenous in a “modern” context (Briggs 1996: 448). Both Canada and Australia, for instance, have made various efforts to use Indigenous peoples as a part of national identity. Myers discusses the value of Aboriginal spirituality, artwork, and ‘authenticity’ to Australian tourism (1991: 502). The Australian environmental movement, similarly (and ironically), constructs Aboriginals as the guardians of spirituality and environmental respect (Myers 1991: 502) in order to oppose state policies. As a Canadian, it is easy to see parallels in the use of Indigenous symbols for the Vancouver Olympic Games (Piccini 2010), in the ubiquitous presence of totem poles, and, indeed, in Reid’s The Spirit of Haida Gwaii sitting outside of our embassy. When I say that these are decontextualized, I mean that they are removed from the lived cultural experiences and meanings of their Indigenous origins and turned into generalized symbols of what is ‘native,’ natural, untouched, pure. They do not challenge state interests on a modern platform because they are not modern. They fit unproblematically into dominant discourses in many ways: by reinforcing notions of a happy multiculturalism with static and uncontested cultural boundaries, by referring to a state of
nature and a ‘common humanity’ (now surpassed by modernism but shared by all), or by turning them into wholly modernized fine art that has left colonial history behind for the better.

What cultural decontextualization does, in other words, is situate Indigenous work either as firmly pre-modern (connected to nature, of the ‘noble savage’ stereotype) and dead or surpassed, or as modern (part of the state apparatus, aesthetically modern, high art not ethnographic material culture). Indigenous spokespeople who fit into neither category – who reject state sovereignty and insist on being complex, alive, and contemporary individuals and societies – may face the double bind we identified earlier. If they claim to be Indigenous, they must be “monolingual, illiterate, and relatively unfamiliar with institutions of the nation-state” (Briggs 1996: 454). If they claim to be both modern and Indigenous, then they must treat their Indigeneity as a safe, static, reified traditional culture that poses no threat to the dominant cultural apparatus. This is perhaps one reason to regard any successful land claim as a fairly miraculous sign of progress.

With this double bind in the background, I will turn to some common themes in two further examples: that of Bill Reid and his artistic and political career, and a now anthropologically well-known exploration of an New York 1984 exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) entitled “‘Primitivism’ in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern” by James Clifford (1988). The latter instance details an exhibit where famous modern art was placed next to tribal artifacts in order to demonstrate aesthetic similarities. As a starting point, it is important to note that both Bill Reid at the beginning of his career and the MOMA exhibit assume ‘art’ to be a universal category, though defined by Western sensibilities. In New York, modernist artists “are shown promoting formerly despised tribal “fetishes”... to the status of high art and in the process discovering new dimensions of their (“our”) creative potential” (Clifford 1988: 152). Similarly, when Reid began sculpting using Haida images, he asserted that those who “come and appreciate [art]... who understand its emotional impact are Europeans with art training. People who live with it all their lives just haven’t got the background in art to appreciate it or appreciate what went on here” (Reid in Remillard 2011: 166). While this point of view changed as his career progressed and he began to identify more and more as Indigenous, this initial stance assumes the same principles as the modernists: that ‘primitive’ art is best interpreted by those with western aesthetic training.

There again is one of the conditions for ‘acceptable’ Indigeneity: to remove whatever contextual codes these material culture items might have had and approach them using a western framework, aesthetics. Decontextualization permits Reid’s career as an interlocutor: “a bridge between cultures, a conduit through which ancient imagery was uncoupled from the tangles of a static pre-contact context, modernized, and regenerated in novel Western-inspired expressions” (Remillard 2011: 169). Clifford identifies the same tendency in MOMA, in that the primary characteristic of modernism evident in the exhibition is “its taste for appropriating or redeeming otherness, for constituting non-Western arts in its own image, for discovering universal, ahistorical “human” capacities” (Clifford 1988: 152). Interestingly, the theme of western modern artists finding affinity and inspiration in Indigenous artwork has happened more than once. In the case of the Surrealists and Northwest Coast material culture, for instance, modern art’s absorption of Indigenous elements had a recognizable impact on the genre (Carpenter 1975: 12).

Specifically in regards to art, the tendency to always approach material culture with an aesthetic interpretive framework has been characterized by Alfred Gell as a failure to use ‘methodological atheism’ (1992: 41). In other words, a sociologically atheistic approach to religious studies does
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not have a parallel in the art world, where the only available interpretive framework remains firmly in the realm of aesthetic and art-world analysis, itself a cultural product.

Again, the flip side of the ‘modern’ inclination to believe that it owns all the territory (be it land, linguistic code, or material culture tradition) is that it will accept Indigeneity that is safely mischaracterized as ahistorical, static, surpassed, no longer a challenge. Art and language have both been used to serve this purpose, with “dead” languages tied to entire peoples (Gal and Irvine 1995). One reason this is so prevalent in the colonial imagination could be salvage ethnography: as pieces of material culture were ‘saved,’ treated as representative of a culture, and scattered throughout “museums, textbooks, and popular media, the entire project of collection and display worked to reinforce, entrench, and naturalize an essentialized version of Indigenous culture (and by extension, people) as anachronistic and unchanging” (Remillard 2011: 163). A friend of Reid spoke of him that “the essence of Haida art, once the lifeblood of an entire people, now survives within him, at a depth…” (Carpenter 1975: 27). The curatorial decision in New York to display non-Western artifacts without specific time periods is similarly telling. What both Clifford and Remillard note is that both decontextualization and reified ‘primitivism’ serve the same purpose, which is to eliminate the possibility of living, hybrid cultures, which have survived colonial history but still bear its marks. As Clifford states quite clearly, “the concrete, inventive existence of tribal cultures and artists is suppressed in the process of either constituting authentic, “traditional” worlds or appreciating their products in the timeless category of ‘art’” (1988: 156).

One of the reasons this paper begins with a discussion of land claims is to show that these discourses have real power to affect lives and Indigenous communities’ sovereignty. Interpretation, representation, and power have collectively shaped the recent histories of Indigenous populations and the states in which they live (Miller 2000). The latter portion of Bill Reid’s career is, for this reason, fascinating. He begins to use his power as a ‘safe’ representative of Indigenous art forms in order to disrupt dominant notions of dead, dying, or static Haida culture. In 1985 he applies for Indian status, and begins to take part in activist projects such as the 1986 Haida protest against deforestation (Remillard 2011: 175). Most strikingly, when invited to take part in an exhibition in Paris, Reid carves the canoe Loo Taas and sends it up the Seine with Haida paddlers using Haida Gwaii passports, “not as a representative piece of formal aesthetics, but as an object of lived ceremonial, cultural, and ritualistic significance” (Remillard 2011: 176). Interestingly, Reid’s trajectory parallels the millennial move in language revitalization scholarship to characterize recorded but unspoken languages as “sleeping” rather than “dead” for the purpose of embracing cultural and linguistic dynamism (Hinton 2001).

Thus, despite powerful discursive constraints there are ways to challenge the double bind that Indigenous interlocutors find themselves in (though in Reid’s case, this ability may rely on positional privilege: Thomas King (2011) also identifies class as an important intersectional factor). In what ways can we continue to interrogate colonial structures and make room in ourselves and our systems for decolonization?. The final section of this paper will explore the various interpretive pitfalls discussed this far and offer a few thoughts about the ways in which to engage responsibly with unfamiliar codes in order to communicate effectively between lived cultures.

4. De-coding and Erasure

De-coding has two meanings here, because before we turn to ideas about how to more accurately communicate between culture groups, it is important to identify some of the reasons
why the current communicative problems exist. There is a striking commonality between the colonial discursive moves identified, in the simultaneous tendencies to (1) decontextualize then re-interpret using our own system and (2) allow contextualization if it looks authentic, where ‘authentic’ means static, ahistorical, and dead or dying. What they have in common is that either way, the rules of exchange erase colonial history. In discourse one, everyone is wholly “modern”. The Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en are property claimants in a national judicial system, the Pintupi are modern artists, Bill Reid is at the forefront of Canadian fine art, the affinities between tribal and modern art demonstrate that all of humanity has always had modern sensibilities. In discourse two, there are moderns and pre-moderns, each group on one side of colonial history with few signs of mixing or contact. ‘Authenticity’ appears to mean asking Indigenous populations to bear the burden of proving that colonialism never happened. Ironically, these two discourses do not actually belong side by side; they intuitively cancel each other out. Unfortunately, it is not usually the colonial audience that notices or has to cope with this opposition. Instead the double bind is created for Indigenous agents who fall anywhere in between those two extremes.

This is meant to be a theoretical sketch of discursive patterns rather than a deterministic proclamation. In fact, so many of the sources in this paper have identified similar themes in their analysis that I am optimistic about the growing awareness of this rather messy hypocrisy in the ways that various settler institutions interpret and represent their engagements with Indigenous peoples. Additionally, many Indigenous artists and activists continue to make progress despite the different ways they can be discursively undermined. As such, while I cannot realistically voice optimism that we will soon see states literally ceding territory on a nation-to-nation basis (even Canada’s latest successful Title case left provisions for crown incursion: see Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia [2014]), I do think that there is room for people and institutions to put more effort into understanding unfamiliar communicative and coding practices. This responsibility is particularly important in cases where there is a jurisdictional or power imbalance.

There are reasons to put in this effort beyond the wish to be a good ally or interpreter. To guide this section to a discussion that may read as more lyrical than political, I want to point to the fact that naming practices and art pieces share the ability to say much with little. The most important reason to take a more critical approach to engaging with Indigenous interlocutors is, of course, social responsibility and justice, but I will suggest with this section that a secondary and related reason has to do with poetry.

There is a connection between giving a chiefly name in a land claims case and the other artistic examples in this paper beyond the critical responses to their respective Indigenous communities. Theorists in linguistic anthropology and elsewhere recognize naming practices, as well as art objects, as signifiers that carry far more with them than what is immediately apparent. One of the most famous discussions of this comes from Keith Basso in Speaking With Names. After spending time amongst the Western Apache and slowly learning the significance of their dialogue, he eventually succeeds in discerning and communicating as much information as he possibly can but concedes that a translation of placenames, “both the richness of their content and the fullness of their spirit” (Basso 1988: 123) cannot ever be done fully. Art and poetry, and naming, and anything expressed succinctly with much hidden beneath it has much to lose from a poor interpreter, and that is what we have noticed thus far. While language and linguistic phenomena have significant unconscious effects at any level of communication, certain forms
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(such as poetry, narrative, naming, and figurative language) appear to harness submerged meaning for particular effects (Chamberlin in Battiste 2000; Hymes 1996: 185-6).

When Basso first begins conducting fieldwork, the brevity and apparent meaninglessness of Apache interactions is bewildering to him, but after time, exposure, and a great deal of help from his interlocutors, he begins to understand the significance of place names and the stories that lie behind them. Finally, he is able to express his appreciation for the communicative patterns and depth of meaning within each toponym, within each succinct and economical exchange (Basso 1988: 114). Most importantly, he continually asserts that while it does help that his informants provide an explanation, a “straight path to knowing” (Basso 1988: 108), the wisdom itself cannot be directly explained or translated. Straight explanation is not a replacement for submerged meaning: “poetry is not a sort of distorted and decorated prose, but rather prose is poetry which has been stripped down and pinned to a Procrustean bed of logic” (Bateson 1972: 145). The same thing is often said of art: “If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it” (Bateson 1972: 147). Art is not only submerged meaning, but also submerged skill: for an artist to excel at their craft, they have immense technical ability which they have so internalized that the product of their labors appears to be effortless, almost magically so (Gell 1992: 55).

Artistic and linguistic efforts both imply a message. As such, both the content and the coding of the message may not be immediately evident – it may be submerged – and if this is the case, then there is an opportunity for the audience to learn and appreciate. It may be far more valuable to learn the vocabulary of signifiers and signified, to try to access the meaning of an art piece, poem, or name as best as one can, than to either give up on ever understanding or to try to create an entirely conscious, rational ‘straight path to knowing.’ The same logic that makes such bare explanation a poor replacement for poetry should carry weight here.

In the anthropological, linguistic, and artistic communities, interpretation is never without value; however, in the time-honored tradition of interrogating our methods, it is inevitably essential to be aware about what is lost in the interpretive process. This paper has tried to deal with the responses that Indigenous interlocutors face when they bring communications to other groups. As such, refusal to interpret could be called a refusal to hear. While my main goal has been to talk about ways in which our hearing is poor, ways in which we can hear better, it is also essential to attend to original source material: responsibly and respectfully. This, I believe, is one key element in a scholar’s ability to play a “mediative” rather than an “extractive” role in work with Indigenous groups (Hymes 1996: 60).

By way of conclusion, I will reiterate a point from the beginning of this paper: that the use of the word ‘colonial’ is meant more as a call for self-awareness than it is as an accusation. Colonialism is a history that many of us would likely prefer to forget, and we certainly try to whenever we evade responsibility by claiming temporal separation, erasing the past as a living entity in today’s people, relationships, and institutions. One of the main points of this discussion has been that when non-Indigenous interpreters erase colonialism, it places Indigenous peoples in an awkward double bind. To accept the label of ‘settler-colonial’ is, I hope, one step towards avoiding the traps identified here, because it implies a commitment to take history seriously. In our roles as academics, citizens, cultural consumers, or humans in colonized nations, accountability and self-awareness are tools we may consider using, along with attention to coding, context, and content in communication. Perhaps most importantly, however, I would argue that the opportunity to approach intercultural communication mindfully is not just a responsibility; it is also a gift, for: “in showing their paintings, Aboriginal people may require
that to have seen something is to be responsible for understanding it” (Myers 1991: 506). While intercultural communication may be full of hurdles and the potential for power imbalance, it also provides some of the most valuable opportunities to work on recognizing the simultaneous diversity of human knowledge and the fundamental temporality of human difference.
References


Relative Clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac

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Relatively little has been published concerning relative clause constructions in Totonacan languages. This paper describes the relative clauses of Coahuitlán Totonac, describing a robust system in terms of Andrews’ (2007) typology of relative clauses. Data was gathered from elicitation, a small experiment, and textual analysis. Coahuitlán Totonac shows remarkable flexibility in allowance of different head types, head positions, and accessibility. Light and nominal head relative constructions are joined by a third type that seems to juxtapose a light element and a nominal head. The head of a relative clause may occur both internally and externally, without apparent semantic motivation or clear preference between internal and external heads. Each position of the Accessibility Hierarchy is accessible to relativisation.

Keywords: relative clauses, typology, Coahuitlán Totonac, Totonacan languages

1. Introduction

Coahuitlán Totonac is a Northern Totonacan language spoken by around 3,800 speakers in the community of Coahuitlán, located in the northern part of the state of Veracruz, Mexico. This paper describes the robust system relative clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac. I begin with some aspects of the grammar Coahuitlán Totonac to assist those unfamiliar with Totonacan languages. Because, like all Totonacan languages, Coahuitlán Totonac has extremely flexible constituent order, grammatical relations are marked primarily by a detailed system of agreement markers. The subject agreement markers, which mark for both person and number, are given in Table 1.

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<td>1 k–EXC</td>
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Table 1: Subject agreement for person and number

The second person singular subject agreement is variable and irregular, for which reason it is not shown on this table. It often involves a leftward stress shift and laryngealisation of the final vowel, and several verbal markers, both inflectional and quasi-inflectional, have a distinct, suppletive form for second person singular agreement. Object agreement markers do not

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1 My thanks to helpful, patient, and supportive consultants in Coahuitlán: paškát kći.nat! Thanks are also due to Jordan Lachler and David Beck, though of course all faults are my own.
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combine person and number. Instead, there is a person-neutral plural object agreement marker kaː-, and the person agreement markers shown in Table 2.

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<td>kin–</td>
<td>–n</td>
<td>Ø</td>
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Table 2: Object agreement for person

For both subject and object, the third person singular is marked by the absence of any other person agreement, or by a zero-morpheme. In addition, there is a great deal of syncretism in the full paradigm of agreement, and some non-compositional forms. These non-compositional forms are combined with a specific set of affixes and are used for a fixed set of subject-object patterns. Two notable ones involve situations where subject and object are first and second person. The first is marked by the combination of first person object kin-, reciprocal marker laː-, and the first person plural subject –w. This form, as shown in (1), signals any combination of second person subject and first person object, where either the subject, object, or both is plural; that is: 2PL > 1SG, 2SG > 1PL, and 2PL > 1PL.

(1) kila:pucayá:w
    kin–la:–puca–ya–w
  1OBJ–RECIP–search–IMPF–1PL.SUBJ
  ‘youPL look for me’, or ‘youSG look for us’, or ‘youPL look for us’

This combination of affixes forms a syncretic verbal complex which is non-compositional and ambiguous between the three possible meanings. Although we might expect some of these meanings to be coded compositionally, e.g., the second plural subject marker and first singular object marker for a plural second person acting on a singular first person, this construction is the only way to mark each of these three cases.

The second notable non-compositional form is composed of the first person singular subject k-, the plural object kaː-, and the second person object –n. This form, as shown in (2), marks any combination of first person subject and second person object, where either subject, object, or both is plural; that is: 1PL > 2SG, 1SG > 2PL, and 1PL > 2PL.

Abbreviations used in this paper: 1, 2, 3 = person, AGT = agentative, COM = comitative, CSV = causative, DCS = decausative, DCT = deictic, DEM = demonstrative, DIST = distal, DTR = detransitive, DTV = determinative, EXC = exclusive, FUT = future, HREL = human relativiser, IMPF = imperfective, INC = inclusive, INSTR = instrumental, INTENS = intensifier, NEG = negative, NMLSR = nominaliser, NPMAT = matrix noun phrase, NPREL = relative noun phrase, NREL = non-human relativiser, OBJ = object, PL = plural, PO = possessive, PTCL = particle, QUOT = quotative, RECIP = reciprocal, REL = relativiser, REP = repititive, SG = singular, SREL = relative subordinated clause, SUBJ = subject, TR = transitiviser. This paper uses an Americanist form of IPA commonly used by Totonacists, with the following notable differences from IPA: c = voiceless alveolar affricate, ƛ = voiceless lateral affricate, y = palatal approximant, ː after a vowel indicates length, ː after a vowel indicates laryngealisation, and´ above a vowel indicates stress. All uncited data comes from my fieldwork of Coahuitlán Totonac.
Beck & Mel’čuk discuss these (and other) verbal complexes, and describe them as morphological idioms (2011). With the system of verbal agreement for subject and object, it is somewhat rare to see fully realised arguments even for transitive verbs. Despite the system of verbal agreement, however, interpretation of argument structure and word order often comes down to pragmatic or contextual cues. This is because of syncretic forms, like those discussed above, and other factors including: the inability of the third person plural subject marker to co-occur with the plural object marker; and the zero markers for third person agreement.

While the agreement patterns help identify subject and object, in verbs that take multiple objects, it is not clear that much difference is made between direct and indirect (or primary and secondary) objects. This can be seen in (3), where plural object agreement is able to agree with either the theme or the recipient of the verb ‘to give’.

(3) kaːmaškḭːyaːːt cuːmáːxáːt šánat
   kaː–maškḭː–yaːː–t cuːmáːxáːt šánat
   PL.OBJ–give–IMPF:2SUBJ–2PL.SBJ girl flower
   ‘youPL gave flowers to the girl,’ or ‘youPL gave a flower to the girls’,
   or ‘youPL gave flowers to the girls’

In this phrase, the ambiguity of the plural object marker kaː- yields three possible meanings. Because nouns do not obligatorily carry number marking, there could either be some flowers and one girl, some girls and one flower, or some girls and some flowers. Although there are many indications that Coahuiltecan should be considered a verb-initial language, the constituent order is extremely flexible, and any order of V, S, and O is possible.

This paper describes the relative clauses of Coahuiltecan Totonac, a robust system with many distinct types of relative clause, in terms of head type, head position, and accessibility. Coahuiltecan Totonac allows relative clauses to be headed by both nominals and light-heads, and an additional type which juxtaposes a light element and a nominal head, and which may be unique to Totonacan languages. Coahuiltecan Totonac allows the head of a relative clause to occur internally or externally. It is notable that there does not seem to be a clear semantic motivation or a general preference for either head or positional type. Each position of the Accessibility Hierarchy is accessible to relativisation. These types will be described on the framework of Andrews’ (2007) typology of relative clauses. Section 0 describes the data and methodology used, before entering into the discussion of relative clauses in Section 0.

2. Methodology

Fieldwork in Coahuiltecan is at an early stage, with available materials mostly limited to a cross-Totonacan survey (Kaufman et al. 2004), which was reconducted in Coahuiltecan by the author; and a modest collection of nearly thirty texts collected during the author’s fieldwork. The data for this paper are largely drawn from this collection of texts, a number of relative clauses gathered in a small experimental elicitation, and direct elicitation to supplement the textual and experimental data.
Many of the texts are traditional stories, often involving anthropomorphic animals and *naguals*, people with the power to transform themselves into animals (or more rarely, other objects like trees). These stories are often widely known and well practised, and thus easy to collect, but they include genre-specific features not common in spoken speech. I have texts of two other genres, both of which aim to provide more natural speech. The first type deals with current or recent events and village life. These are less-practised and can involve more variation in narrative form, i.e., two texts are given from a first-person perspective unusual in *cuentos*, but presumably more common in spoken language. Those of the second type were collected by showing a consultant a short animated clip (a “short”), and asking for the consultant to retell the story in Totonac. These are obviously more spontaneous and do not have as many genre-specific features. From the collected texts, nearly one hundred relative clauses were identified and analysed.

In addition to the textual examples, a small experiment was devised to elicit spontaneous relative clauses. There does not seem to be much information available on the practice of collecting relative clauses in a fieldwork setting. This paper uses a method loosely copied from a paper by Gennari et al. (2012) published in Cognitive Psychology. A set of pictures was made, using clipart freely available from [www.classroomclipart.com](http://www.classroomclipart.com). In each picture, multiple referents are placed together, and a number of questions are asked which seek responses that use a relative clause to identify a specific referent. For example, in Figure 1, there are two boys, one in a yellow shirt and red cape standing on a table, and another in a white shirt running to show his mother a piece of paper.

![Figure 1: An example relative clause Elicitation picture set](image-url)

A number of questions might be asked, including “Which boy is wearing yellow?” (The boy *who is standing on the table*), or “Which boy is running to his mother?” (The boy *who is carrying a bag*). The obvious drawback of this method is that consultants are capable of answering these types of questions using numerous strategies in addition to relative clauses; however, a large number of spontaneous relative clauses was successfully obtained.

3. Relative Clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac

This paper follows Andrews (2007), defining relative clauses as follows: “A relative clause is a subordinate clause which delimits the reference of an NP by specifying the role of the referent of that NP in the situation described by the relative clause”. The NP delimited has a role in the matrix clause, and so is called $NP_{mat}$. The relative clause is often referred to as RC or $S_{rel}$. 
Andrews’ typology is largely based on this structural understanding of the parts of relative clauses; however, another important part of understanding relative clauses is the domain nominal, or head. The head is defined by the “semantic function of identifying the domain of objects upon which the relative clause imposes a further restriction” (Andrews 2007). Lehmann stresses that the head, the NP modified by the relative clause, is primarily a semantic and not a syntactic notion (1986). The head has a role in both clauses, described as NP_{mat} function and NP_{rel} function.

In Coahuitlán Totonac, Relative clauses are introduced by a relativiser, *tuː* or *tiː*; the choice of which is made by the animacy of the head. *Tiː* is used with animate heads, (4), and *tuː* for inanimate, (5). These two sentences show typical relative clauses with overt nominal heads, shown in bold, which are modified by subordinate clauses, enclosed in square brackets.

(4) y šconejo tiː: namakta:yá, namaklakaskín
    and 3PO–rabbit [HREL FUT–help] FUT–use
    ‘and he will use the rabbit who is going to help him’

(5) čúncə laː: kəčːiː qoː:č tuː: ču namaklakaskín liːpánlí
    now NEG know boy [NREL PTCL FUT–use INSTR–sweep–NMLSR]
    ‘and now the boy didn’t know which broom he would use’

In (1), the head *conejo* ‘rabbit’ is introduced by the animate relativiser *tiː*: NP_{mat} function of the head *conejo* is object of the matrix verb ‘use’ and NP_{rel} function is that of subject of the embedded verb ‘help’. The head is realised in NP_{mat}, outside of the relative clause. In (5), the head *liːpánlí* ‘broom’ is introduced by the inanimate relativiser *tuː*: NP_{mat} function of the head *liːpánlí* is object of the matrix verb ‘know’ and NP_{rel} function is the object of the embedded verb ‘use’. However, in (5) the head is not realised in NP_{mat}, but is realised within the relative clause. Coahuitlán Totonac also allows relative clauses where the head is not expressed at all, like that in (6).

(6) minča špuskáː:t pus lakmíl, čon tiː: tal:iːm tálca
    come–DIST 3PO–woman well leg–come–PFV, PTCL [HREL 3PL.SUBJ–bring–PFV=now]
    ta–qan–liː=ca
    3PL.SUBJ–go–PFV=now
    ‘his wife came, well, she came, and those who brought him, they left’

In this sentence, the relative clause has no overt nominal head; however, the semantic definition of head applies: the head is understood to be the entity, person or thing, whose reference is modified or restricted by the relative clause. In this case, the subject of matrix verb *qan* ‘go’, and the subject of embedded verb *liː:mín* ‘bring’ is the group of people who brought him, the man whose wife is referenced in the matrix clause, and then left. We know it is a group because of the 3rd plural subject agreement on both verbs, and the relativiser *tiː* indicates an animate head.

As these examples demonstrate, Coahuitlán Totonac allows many different types of relative clauses. I will use Andrews’ typology of relative clauses to organise this examination of
relative clauses. This typology, elaborated by Andrews (2007), identifies four dimensions of variation: the structural relationship between S\textsubscript{rel} and \textit{NP\textsubscript{mat}}, the treatment of \textit{NP\textsubscript{rel}} function, the constraints on \textit{NP\textsubscript{rel}} function, and the treatment of \textit{S\textsubscript{rel}} as a whole. In addition to Andrews’ four dimensions, Coahuitlán Totonac allows some variation in what may constitute the head of \textit{NP\textsubscript{rel}}, including nominals, light heads, and an interesting construction involving both. I will begin in Section 0 with a discussion of the head. Andrews’ dimensions are discussed in the next sections: the structural relationships between \textit{S\textsubscript{rel}} and \textit{NP\textsubscript{mat}} (Section 0); the treatment of the \textit{NP\textsubscript{rel}} function (Section 0); constraints on the possibilities for what the \textit{NP\textsubscript{rel}} function can be (Section 0); and the treatment of \textit{S\textsubscript{rel}} as a whole (Section 0).

3.1 Head & Type of Head
Coahuitlán Totonac has four types of relative clause determined by head type: nominal, headless, light, and light-appositive. Relative clauses headed by nominals are seen in (4) and (5), and a headless relative clause in (6). In addition to headless and nominal headed relative clauses, Citko (2004) observes that some languages allow a type of relative construction headed by morphologically ‘light’ elements, called light-headed relative clauses. Citko gives the following Polish example, (7). Light-heads are underlined.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Polish}
\end{center}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(7)] 
\begin{tabular}{l}
Jan czyta [co Maria czyta]
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{l}
Jan read this [what Maria read]
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{l}
‘Jan reads what Maria reads’
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{(Citko 2004:96)}
\end{tabular}
\end{enumerate}

This example is similar to headless relative clauses, except for the presence of the demonstrative pronoun \textit{to}. Citko also describes, for Polish, other ways the treatment of light-headed relative clauses differs from nominal headed. Coahuitlán Totonac has a type of light-headed relative clause, most typically with the demonstrative \textit{u::} (8).

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(8)] 
\begin{tabular}{l}
štali:laqapásnː u:n tiː: šmaqniː:nː\textfrac{1}{2}\
š–tali:laqapásnː uː [tiː: š–maqniː:–nːː]\textfrac{1}{2}
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{3PO–acquaintance DEM [HREL PAST–kill–PERF]}
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{l}
‘he was the friend of him whom [the hunter] had killed’
\end{tabular}
\end{enumerate}

Like in Polish, the head of the relative clause is the person who was killed by the hunter, but the only overt expression of this head is the demonstrative \textit{u::}. In the first line of (8), this demonstrative presents a prosodic juncture phenomena—an epenthetic /n/ following \textit{u::}. This phenomenon, while not yet fully understood, seems to occur between members of a phonological constituent. It is commonly observed on a demonstrative before the relativisers \textit{ti::} and \textit{tu::}, and often on the relativisers themselves. A similar juncture phenomenon has been described as prenasalisation in Ozelonacaxtla Totonac, a member of the Sierra Totonac branch (Román Lobato 2008). Unlike Polish, where light-heads impose restrictions on the relative pronouns used, light-headed relative clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac do not seem to receive any special treatment compared to nominally headed or headless relative clauses.

Citko further shows that demonstratives, indefinites, negative indefinites, and universals can all function as light heads in Polish. In Coahuitlán Totonac light-headed relative clauses


\begin{center}
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\end{center}
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maybe headed by uː, other demonstratives, positive and negative indefinites, and universals. Totonacan languages have a complex system of deictic and demonstrative elements, albeit one that may be suffering from language attrition. In Upper Necaxa Totonac, a geographically and genetically close variety, Beck (2011) describes a system where deictic roots are marked for demonstrativeness (non-demonstrative and demonstrative) and distance (proximate, medial, distal; and also specific, though specific does not mark demonstrativeness) and can occur alone as deictic adverbs or combine with roots to form more restricted senses, such as determiners, local, non-local, and temporal adverbs. While the full system has not been observed in Coahuitlán Totonac, many of the elements of the system are in use. There are at least three demonstrative elements that are quite common, and can occur as light heads: uː, aːmá, and ca̰ má.

(8) above, shows uː as the light head of a relative clause. (9) and (10) show aːmá and ca̰ má as light heads.

(9) aːmá:tu: céqa kqálí talakapastákní šalakwán
DEM [NREL secret.ADV 1SG.SUBJ–hold INCH–remember–NMLSR] DTV–good
‘that which thought which I hold secret is a good thing’

‘those who helped to bathe [the baby] (the midwives) were wise, so they were watching’

In each of these sentences, the light head comes before the relativiser, tu: or ti:. In (9), in addition to the light head aːmá, there appears to be a nominal head talakapastákní ‘thought, idea’. I will return to this interesting case below.

Coahuitlán has both positive and negative indefinites, both of which are related to the relativisers (and interrogatives). Positive indefinites are formed with the formula ka-REL-wa, yielding katiː:wa ‘someone, anyone’ and katuː:wa ‘something, anything’. Both of these can act as light heads, (11) and (12).

(11) katiː:wan:ti: klakapása
katiː:wa [ti: k–lakapás–a]
someone [HREL 1SG.SUBJ–know–IMPF]
‘someone, some people whom I know’

(12) katuː:wan:tu: nakto:yáw
katuː:wa [tu: na–k–to:–ya–w]
something [NREL FUT–1SG.SUBJ–do–IMPF–1PL.SUBJ]
‘something that we are going to do’

Negative indefinites combine the negative morpheme with the relativiser or interrogative, giving laː:ti: ‘no one, nobody’ and laː:tu: ‘nothing’. These are also both capable of being light heads, (13) and (14).
(13) laːtːiː tiː liːqamaːnamːː pelota
laːtːiː [tiː liː=qamaːnan–mːː pelota]  
  nobody [HREL INSTR–play–PROG ball]  
  ‘there is no one who is playing with the ball’

(14) laːtuː tuː škayáwa
laːtuː [tuː škayáwa]  
  nothing [NREL green]  
  ‘there is nothing that is green’

Coahuitlán also allows the universal *puːtím* ‘all’ to function as the head of a relative clause, (15)

(15) puːtím tiːn taqosnún
puːtím [tiː taːqosnún]  
  all [HREL 3PL.SUBJ–run]  
  ‘everyone who is running’

As we saw in (9) above, a light element can co-occur with a nominal head. This intriguing relative construction allows different light elements which occur directly before the relativiser, and a nominal head which can occur externally, (16), and internally (17) and (18). I follow Beck (2014) in calling this a light-appositive construction, because the light element is in apposition to the nominal.

(16) ča̰ːtːim čiškú uːn tiːn teːwaːnːjː qaːlwati aca káːtac
ča̰ː–tːim čiškú uː [tiː teː−waː−nːjː qaːlwati aca káːta=ca]  
  CLF–one man DEM [HREL PATH–eat–PERF egg there year=now]  
  ‘one man who came by and ate an egg a year ago’

(17) es queca paːcanqáːl uːn tuː šliːwát
es queca paːcanqa−li uː [tuː šliːwát]  
  it.is that=now forget–PFV DEM [NREL 3PO–food]  
  ‘now he forgot (that which was) his food’

(18) laːtiː tiː štaːlaːtoːná̰ šxúruːl
laːtiː [tiː š–taː−laː−toː−ná̰ š–xuru−li]  
  ‘there was no one there, the opponent who beat him’

In (16), the relative clause is introduced with *tːiː*, the animate relativiser. The relative clause has both a light element and a nominal head: *uː*, directly preceding the relativiser, and the nominal *čaːtːim čiškú* ‘one man’, which is external to the relative clause. (17) shows a relative clause introduced with *nuː* with both a nominal head, *šliːwát* ‘his food’ and a light element *uː*. In this sentence, the nominal head is embedded inside the relative clause. The interesting sentence in (18) comes from a story where a man is playing a game against himself, and even though there is no one there, his opponent is beating him. The nominal *štaːlaːtoːná̰* ‘his opponent’ is joined by the light element *laːtiː* ‘no one’.
All four of these types—nominal, headless, light, and light-appositive—show up in the textual and experimental examples, as shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head Type</th>
<th>Textual</th>
<th>Experimental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headless:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-appositive:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Distribution of head type by data source

In textual examples, nominal are the most frequent, followed by headless, while in the experimental data, light and light-appositive are the most frequent, and there is only one headless relative clause. This marked difference is probably due in large part to the nature of the task. While the semantic differences between the different types of relative clause are not yet understood, the experimental context involved pointing at pictures and dealing with specific referents that were continually pointed at (see Section 2). In this situation, it is no surprise that a great deal of the examples involved demonstrative elements, and thus light and light-appositive heads. The most natural responses in this pointing context seemed to be light headed, but interestingly, the two types with an overt nominal, nominally-headed and light-appositive, were roughly equal. In the experimental data, $u$: was the only light element used as a head. While it seems that $u$: is the most frequent demonstrative or light element associated with relative clauses, changes in the task, such as pointing at an object further away, would likely influence this result. That is, the demonstrative used likely is due in part to the physical configuration of the experimental situation. In textual examples, where the physical configuration is likely less influential, $u$: still accounted for most of the light elements, used in 82% of both light headed and light-appositive relative clauses (18 of 22). $A:\text{má}$ and $ca\text{má}$ were each used once in light headed relative clauses, and in light-appositive clauses there was one example of $a:\text{má}$ and one of the negative indefinite $la:\text{ti}$.

3.2 Relation between Srel & NPmat

The first dimension of Andrews’ (2007) typology is the relationship between $S_{rel}$ and $NP_{mat}$, specifically, whether or not $S_{rel}$ is embedded in $NP_{mat}$. While some languages allow relative clauses with $S_{rel}$ outside of $NP_{mat}$, there does not seem to be evidence for this kind of relative clause in Coahuitlán Totonac. However, there are three major subdivisions of embedded relative clauses based on the relationship between the head and $S_{rel}$. External relative clauses have the head outside of $S_{rel}$, while internal relative clauses have their head within $S_{rel}$, and free relative clauses have no overt expression of the head. Free relative clauses are discussed in Section 0, there called “headless”, and they will not be discussed further in this section.

As we have seen above, Coahuitlán has external and internal relative clauses. These configurations are illustrated again in the following examples: external (19), and internal (20).
skúxmaː lakacuná cumaxáːt [tiː lakatí–li]
work–PROG near girl [HREL like–PFV]
‘the girl whom he likes works near here’

The head of this phrase is cumaxáːt ‘girl, young woman’, and comes just before the relativiser.

porque šamaktím pał ca tamakštimí tu: laː ceya uːn
porque ša–mak–tím pał ca ta–mak–štím–i [tuː laː ceya uːn]
because DTV–CLF–one if PTCL DCS–together–TR [NREL NEG good wind]
‘because the winds which are bad could join together’

This phrase is an idiom, the bad winds coming or joining together means that bad things will happen. The head uːn ‘wind’, is a predicate complement, and sits inside the relative clause.

While some of the orderings are not as felicitous, especially without context, each of the orderings is possible with the meaning ‘the ball which the boy kicked’. Given the freedom of placement in these orderings, it is clear that the head pelota is within the relative clause. I return to the matter of constituent ordering in relative clauses in Section 0.

Nominal heads can occur both externally and internally as in (20) and (21). The nominal head in the light-appositive construction can also occur externally or internally, as we saw above in (16) and (17). While the nominal part of the light-appositive construction can appear internally or externally, the light element always comes before the relativiser. The light element in light-headed relative clauses behaves the same, as in (22), where çamá comes before tíː:

(19) skúxmaː lakacuná cumaxáːt [tiː lakatí–li]
work–PROG near girl [HREL like–PFV]
‘the girl whom he likes works near here’

(20) porque šamaktím pał ca tamakštimí tuː laː ceya uːn
porque ša–mak–tím pał ca ta–mak–štím–i [tuː laː ceya uːn]
because DTV–CLF–one if PTCL DCS–together–TR [NREL NEG good wind]
‘because the winds which are bad could join together’

Rather than saying that light-headed relative clauses only occur externally, it may be that the relation is better described by saying the relationship between the head and Srel is free. Citko (2004) also discusses the similarity between light-headed and headless, or free, relative clauses.
Table 4 presents the distribution of nominal and light-appositive relative clauses by position of head.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Textual</th>
<th>Experimental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nominal relative clauses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal:</td>
<td>8  20%</td>
<td>3  25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External:</td>
<td>33 80%</td>
<td>9  75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>41 100%</td>
<td>12 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light-appositive relative clauses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal:</td>
<td>7  64%</td>
<td>15 94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External:</td>
<td>4  36%</td>
<td>1  6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>11 100%</td>
<td>16 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Distribution of internal and external nominals

In the textual data, nominal heads are more likely to be external, and light-appositive heads are slightly more likely to be internal, a relationship seen more strongly in the experimental results. This is interesting because it could preclude an argument of either internal or external relative clauses being more unmarked. Typologically, it is somewhat rare for a language to have both internal and external relative clauses. It would be extremely rare for a language to have both constructions without one of them being more ‘basic’ or unmarked.

3.3 Treatment of NP_{rel}

Andrews explains that in many languages, NP_{rel} receives special treatment, typically some combination of marking, movement, omission, or reduction. In Coahuitlán Totonac, there is no special treatment of NP_{rel} in terms of movement or marking. The question of omission is made interesting by how easily Coahuitlán Totonac allows the different types of relative construction. Coahuitlán Totonac allows NP_{mat} to be omitted in internally-headed relative clauses as easily as NP_{rel} is omitted in externally-headed relative clauses, or for no overt expression to be made in headless relative clauses. Consider the elicited relative clauses in (23), (24), and (25).

(23) tu: laktá:ya:ma: pelota qó:ča
    [NREL leg–stand–PROG ball boy]
    ‘the ball which the boy kicked’

(24) pelota tu: laktá:ya:ma: qó:ča
    ball [NREL leg–stand–PROG boy]
    ‘the ball which the boy kicked’

    [NREL leg–stand–PROG boy]
    ‘that (ball) which the boy kicked’
The first relative clause is internally headed, the second externally headed. In the first two cases, the head appears only in one clause, the matrix in externally headed (24), and NP_rel in internally headed (23). Because the head appears in only one clause, but has a function in both, we can say that the head is omitted in the clause where it does not appear. In the headless clause, (25), the head is not overtly expressed at all, and is omitted from both. The same principles which determine omission and ordering in a matrix clause seem to be at play, and could potentially determine even whether a relative clause is internally- or externally-headed. Some discussion of this is made in Beck (to appear).

3.4 Constraints on Function of NP_rel

Typologically, the main constraint on the function of NP_rel involves the Accessibility Hierarchy introduced by Keenan and Comrie (1977), concerning the grammatical functions accessible to NP_rel. The Accessibility Hierarchy puts grammatical functions on a hierarchy, with the implication that if a grammatical function is accessible to relativisation, all grammatical functions higher on the hierarchy will also be accessible. Coahuitlán Totonac allows the relativisation of grammatical functions of all ranks on the hierarchy: subject, objects, adjuncts, predicates, possessors, and objects of comparison. Examples were found in the texts for relative clauses in each function except comparatives, which were, however, easily elicited in the experimental data, as well as direct elicitation.

3.4.1 Subject-centred

Subject-centered relative clauses are common, like that in (26).

(26) toː w agradecimientos a dios porque uː n tiː źkinkaː maː suː niparanjː tǎn aː má taqalː n
do–1PL.SBJ thanks to God because DEM
   [HREL.PAST–1OBJ–PL.OBJ–CSV–be.visible–REP–PERF DEM animal]
   ‘we thanked God because it was he who helped us find the animal’

This sentence contains a light-headed subject-centred relative clause. The verb in the relative clause agrees with a first person plural object and a third person singular subject, and the larger context of the sentence shows that this third person is Dios ‘God’, who the family was thanking because they had prayed to find their mule, and had then found it. The following two clauses show nominally headed subject-centred clauses, with an internal head, (27), and with an external head, (28).
(27) ašni čon či cukulcąq qotanu, čon ka:wani, ti: štata:anq: qalatátį
when PTCL manner begin–PFV=now afternoon PTCL OBJ–say–BEN

[HREL PAST–3PL.SUBJ–COM–go–PERF CLF–four]
‘and now when it began to be afternoon, he said to the four who had went out with him’

(28) tigre ti: sta:lanimá: cásanką

jaguar [HREL follow–BEN–PROG peccary]
‘the jaguar who was following the peccary’

In the first sentence, qalatátį ‘the four’ is the head of the relative clause, acting as the subject of the verb ‘to go’. In the matrix clause, it is the object of the verb ka:wani ‘to tell them’. The matrix verb agrees with a plural object, and the relative verb agrees with a third person plural subject. In the second sentence, the Spanish loan tigre, referring here to a jaguar, is external to the relative clause, but controls subject agreement on the verb of Srel.

3.4.2 Object-centred

There are many examples of object-centred relative clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac, such as (29).

(29) qó:ča maškiːka: čaːtimi cumaxáːtin ti: lu: š lakati
boy give–INDEF:PFV CLF–one girl [HREL very PAST–like]
‘they gave the girl whom he liked very much to the boy’

This sentence has an externally-headed relative clause, the object of ‘to like’ in the relative clause is cumaxáːt ‘the girl’, which is also an object in the matrix clause (the theme). As this example shows, there can be multiple objects in a phrase. At this time, I can make no definite distinctions between the different types of objects for Coahuitlán.3 However, I present two relative clauses involving the ditransitive verb ‘give’, one in which the theme is relativised, (30), and the other in which the recipient is relativised, (31).

(30) čo wa:paraqǒː laktó:paraqǒː l xon tu: maškiː l štì:lan
‘and again he wasted all that which the hen gave to him’

(31) qó:ča uːn ti: maškiː ma: poqos šacikan šnaná uːn kintála
boy DEM [HREL give–PROG balloon DTV–grandma 3PO–mother DEM 1PO–friend]
‘the boy, to whom his grandmother gave him balloons, is my friend’

3 See (Beck, 2016) for a discussion of multiple objects in Upper Necaxa Totonac.
In the first relative clause, the theme of ‘give’, the item given, which in this case is money, is the head of the relative clause, although it is not overtly expressed. In the second case, the recipient of ‘give’ is the boy who heads the external light-appositive relative clause.

3.4.3 Adjunct-centred
In Coahuilteán, locative-centred adjuncts can be relativised, (32), although with special relativiser laː, which is also the interrogative ‘where’.

‘they agreed on where they would meet together’

This is a headless clause where the location is ‘where they would meet together’. This kind of relative clause can also occur with the light head ancáː, a local deictic, (33). Another example is given which is nominally headed, (34).

(33) ancáː laː wí puskáːt tiː waːmáː kséqni
[laː wí puskáːt [tiː waːː–máː k–séqni]]
DCT [where sit woman [HREL eat–PROG 3PO–banana]]
‘there where the woman who is eating her banana sits’

(34) kintaːla tamáː waːl carro laː ąkpuːwáka spuːn
kin–taːla tamáː waːl carro [laː ąkpuː–wáka spuːn]
1PO–brother buy–PFV car [where crown–be.high bird]
‘my brother bought the car where the birds are sitting on it (with the birds sitting on it)’

In (33), there are two relative clauses, the first is our locative-centered light headed relative clause ‘there where the woman sits’. The woman is further modified by an exterior nominally-headed relative clause ‘who is eating her banana’. The nominally headed locative-centred relative clause in (34) is headed by carro ‘car’. The car is the location where the birds are sitting; the entire relative clause serves to delimit the reference of car by specifying which car was bought.

3.4.4 Predicate-centred
In Coahuilteán Totonac the copula, wan, is not expressed without additional morphology; i.e., future na–, past tense š–, or one of several quasi-inflectional markers, such as the repetitive -para. In predicate-centred relative clauses, the predicate complement is the head of the relative clause, as we saw above in (20), repeated here as (35).

(35) porque šamaktím paːl ca tamakštimi tuː laː ceya uːn
porque ša–mak–tím paːl ca taː–mak–štim–i [tuː laː ceya uːn]
because DTV–CLF–one if PTCL DCS–together–TR [NREL NEG good wind]
‘because the winds which are bad could join together’
In this relative clause, the nominal uːn ‘wind’ appears inside the relative clause, and is the predicate complement modified by the adjective laː ceya ‘bad’. The copula is not overtly realised in the present tense. Another predicate-centred relative clause is shown in (36).

(36) čon cíkan ti: šta:la:kacuná
    čo cíkan [ti: š–ta:la:kacuná]
    PTCL old.woman [HREL 3PO–neighbour]
    ‘the old woman who is his neighbour’

In this relative clause, the nominal head cíkan ‘old woman’ is external to the relative clause.

3.4.5 Possessive-centred

Possessive constructions involve a set of affixes, which are attached to the possessed and agree with person and number of the possessor, shown in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SINGULAR</th>
<th>PLURAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>kinčík</td>
<td>kinčíkan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>minčík</td>
<td>minčíkan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ščik</td>
<td>ščikan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Possessive affixes with čik ‘house’

The morphemes /kin-/ and /min-/ for first and second person each have an allomorph without final /n/ that occurs before liquids and nasals. The final /n/ for each is also involved in place assimilation with following consonants. The third person /š-1 has allomorphs {/s-1, /k-1}. /s-1 occurs before the alveolar affricate: scumaxáːt ‘his daughter’. /k-1 occurs before the alveolar, post-alveolar, and lateral fricatives: kservietta ‘his napkin’; kškaːn ‘his water’; klůkyː ‘his cave’. The marked possessed comes before the possessor, as in (37).

(37) klůkyː: kuyú:
    š–lůkyː: kuyú:
    3PO–cave armadillo
    ‘the armadillo’s cave’

This example has the /k-1 allomorph of the third-person possessive marker. A possessor-centered relative clause is given in (38).

(38) čo mati ka:wání ti: ščik
    čo mat ka:–wan–ní [ti: š–čik]
    PTCL QUOT PL.OBJ–say–BEN [HREL 3PO–house]
    ‘and the owner of the house told them …’

In this case, the head of the relative clause is the possessor of čik ‘house’, which is not overtly expressed. This is the same person who, in the matrix clause, is the subject of the verb ‘to tell’. Internally- and externally-headed nominal relative clauses are shown in (39) and (40).
Relative Clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac

(39) tu: qosmá: nakšakpú:n kjwj spu:n
    [NREL fly–PROG LOC=3PO–crown tree bird]
    ‘the tree over which the bird is flying’

(40) cumaxáːt u:n ti: šcin šaspinín ma:qósul pelota
    cumaxáːt u: [ti: š–cin ša–spinín] ma:–qos–u·l pelota
    ‘the girl whose clothes are red threw the ball’

The first phrase is internally-headed by kḭ́wḭ ‘tree’, which is the possessor of the relational part ‘crown’ to give the meaning ‘over’. Locational information is often encoded with relational parts in possessive constructions (Levy 1999). The second example is light-appositive, externally-headed by cumaxáːt ‘girl’.

3.4.6 Comparative-centred

Comparative constructions involve a standard and a marker of comparison. The marker is the noun phrase which is the focus of the construction, compared against the standard. (41) is an example of a comparative construction in Coahuitlán Totonac.

(41) cumaxáːt taq šapiːpí či maqapicin cumaxáːt
    cumaxáːt taq ša–piːpí či maqapicin cumaxáːt
    girl more DTV–older how some girl
    ‘the girl is older than the other girls’

In this construction, the marker is ‘the girl’ compared with the adjective šapiːpí ‘older (used only for females)’ to the standard of ‘the other girls’. The standard is marked by the manner particle či, which acts in several ways to indicate or question the manner of an action. (42) and (43) are comparative-centered relative clauses.

(42) ti: cumaxáːt taq šapiːpí či čaːto lakcumaxáːn čipaní čáčaq
    ‘the girl who is older than the other two girls holds a frog’

(43) cumaxáːt ti: taq šapiːpí či maqapicin cumaxáːt čipaní čáčaq
    girl [HREL more DTV–older how other girl] grasp–IMPFV–BEN frog
    ‘the girl who is older than the other girls holds a frog’

In both these clauses, ‘the girl’ is the head of the relative clause, the subject of the matrix verb ‘to hold’, and the marker of comparison, against a standard of comparison. Plural marking is optional and appears on the ‘other two girls’ in (42), but not on ‘the other girls’ in (43). The primary difference between these two clauses is that in (42), the head cumaxáːt is internal, while (43) is externally headed.
3.5 Treatment of Srel

There does not appear to be much apparent difference between $S_{rel}$ and matrix clauses ($S_{mat}$). One of the notable features of relative clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac is the flexibility of constituent ordering. This is shown above in (21), which I repeat here as (44).

(44) \( \text{tu: laktáːyama: pelota qóːča} \)

\[ \text{[tu: lak–táːya–ma: pelota qóːča]} \]

\[ \text{[NREL leg–stand–PROG ball boy]} \]

‘the ball which the boy is kicking’

\[ \text{[tu: laktáːyama: qóːča pelota]} \]

\[ \text{[tuː n qóːča laktáːyama: pelota]} \]

\[ \text{[tuː n pelota laktáːyama: qóːča]} \]

\[ \text{[tuː n pelota qóːča laktáːyama:]} \]

\[ \text{[tuː n qóːča pelota laktáːyama:]} \]

This ordering matches the flexibility of matrix clauses, (45).

(45) \( \text{laktáːyama: pelota qóːča} \)

\[ \text{lak–táːya–ma: pelota qóːča} \]

\[ \text{leg–stand–PROG ball boy} \]

‘the boy is kicking the ball’

\[ \text{laktáːyama: qóːča pelota} \]

\[ \text{qóːča laktáːyama: pelota} \]

\[ \text{pelota laktáːyama: qóːča} \]

\[ \text{qóːča pelota laktáːyama:} \]

\[ \text{pelota qóːča laktáːyama:} \]

Matrix and relative clauses both show flexible constituent ordering. Other than the relativiser, there is little to differentiate matrix and relative clauses.

4. Discussion

The dimensions discussed in this paper show that there are many different types of relative clause, with different types of heads, heads occurring in different positions, and different positions on the Accessibility Hierarchy. Coahuitlán is remarkable for its flexibility in filling each of the possibilities expressed by these dimensions. Coahuitlán Totonac allows many types of head: nominal, free, light, and light-appositive; is very free in allowing different positions on the Accessibility Hierarchy to be relativised; and is especially remarkable in the high frequency of both internally- and externally-headed relative clauses. Given the range of possibilities to the formal type of relative clause, the great question is what principles and factors influence the selection of one type over another. This is especially intriguing considering the relative ease with which speakers allow variation in a specific phrase under discussion. However, it is unlikely that this question will be answered through elicited data or translated glosses.

There has been very little descriptive material published on Totonacan relative clauses, except for some preliminary work by Beck (2014, to appear). The current paper contributes a
description of the flexible and varied relative system in Coahuitlán Totonac. In addition to the variation described within Coahuitlán, there seems to be an interesting amount of variation between the systems of Totonacan languages. Further research is needed in comparing this variety and other Totonacan languages. A better understanding of relative clauses in Coahuitlán Totonac and other Totonacan languages will be a valuable contribution to our understanding of this family and of relative clauses.
References


